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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. USE AND SALES TAX EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONiS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Thayer v. South Carolina Tax Commission1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that South Carolina's use and sales tax exemption
for religious publications2 violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 3 The court found the exemption unconstitutional under the
first two prongs of the Lemon v. Kurtzman4 Establishment Clause test.5
Catherine Thayer, the appellant, purchased copies of a real estate
guide, The Real Estate Book, which she planned to distribute free of
charge in local stores. Because the guide was printed and published in
Georgia, however, the South Carolina Tax Commission assessed a use
tax on the publication.6 Thayer paid one month's tax under protest and
challenged the constitutionality of the tax exemption given to newspapers
and religious publications.7
The supreme court held that the exemption for newspapers was
constitutional, but that the exemption for religious publications failed the
Lemon test.8 The court concluded that the religious exemption did not
1. 413 S.E.2d 810 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-35-550(7) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (current version at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)). The purpose of a use tax
is to ensure "that the local use of an item purchased outside the state is taxed in the
same amount it would be if it were purchased locally." Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 813
(citing State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 517, 66 S.E.2d 33, 46 (1951)).
3. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 814. The Establishment Clause prohibits a state from
making any "law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon Court developed a three-part test to
determine -whether an enactment complies with the Establishment Clause: First, the
law must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its primary effect must neither
advance nor inhibit religion; and, third, the law must not foster "'excessive
government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
5. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 814.
6. Id. at 812. The tax assessed for the period from May 1, 1985 to December
31, 1988 equalled $39,727.80 plus interest and penalties. Id.
7. Id. Thayer argued that the newspaper exemption violated the Free Press
Clause by exempting newspapers but not all publications. The court quickly disposed
of this argument under Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (holding that
differential taxation is constitutional as long as it is not an attempt to restrain
particular ideas). Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 813.
8. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 813. For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra note
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have a secular purpose because it did not apply to "a broad class of
nonsectarian groups.' In Texas Monthly v. Bullock"0 the United States
Supreme Court held that a Texas statute which solely exempted religious
publications from taxation" violated the Establishment Clause.' The
Thayer court concluded that the South Carolina statute was unconstitu-
tional because it, like the Texas exemption, was "confined impermissibly
to publications advancing the tenets of a religious faith."" 3
The court also held that the exemption failed the second prong of the
Lemon test because the statute's primary effect was to advance reli-
gion. 4 Again relying on Texas Monthly, the court stated: "A statute
cannot stand when its primary effect is to endorse the communication of
religious messages." 5 The court emphasized that the statute "clearly
9. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989)).
10. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
11. TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.312 OVest 1982) ("Periodicals that are
published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings
sacred to a religious faith are exempted from the taxes imposed by this chapter.")
(superseded).
12. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5. The Court invalidated the Texas statute despite
the apparent applicability of Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(upholding a New York prol3erty tax exemption for religious organizations). The
Texas Monthly Court distinguished Walz by stating that the Walz exemption applied
to both religious and other nonprofit organizations. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 12.
However, the dissent in Texas Monthly noted:
LT]he Walz Court did discuss the fact that the New York tax exemption
applied not just to religions but to certain other "nonprofit" groups,
including "hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional,
historical, and patriotic groups." The finding of valid legislative purpose
was not rested upon that, however, but upon the more direct proposition
that "exemption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard
against" the "latent dangers" of governmental hostility towards religion
"inherent in the imposition of property taxes." The venerable federal
legislation that the Court cited to support its holding was not legislation
that exempted religion along with other things, but legislation that
exempted religion alone.
Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
13. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 813.
14. Id. at 814. The court declined to examine the third prong of the Lemon test
because the court concluded that the exemption failed the first two prongs. Id. at 814
n.1.
15. Id. at 814 (citing Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28).
[Vol. 44
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singles out 'religious proselytizing as an activity deserving of public
assistance.'" 
16
Although the Thayer court recognized the similarity between the
Texas statute and the South Carolina statute, the South Carolina
exemption is distinguishable because it also exempted newspapers. 17 The
Court in Texas Monthly held that an exemption violates the Establishment
Clause when it is "confined exclusively to publications advancing the
tenets of a religious faith.""1 Because South Carolina's statute also
exempted newspapers, it was not "confined exclusively" to religious
publications; therefore, the exemption arguably did not come within the
scope of Texas Monthly. However, the Thayer court did not view the
exemption so broadly. The court stated that other tax exemptions granted
for secular purposes do not validate a tax exemption granted solely for
religious purposes. 9
Upon concluding that the tax exemption for religious publications
was unconstitutional, the court severed the invalid exemption language
from the statute, leaving the remainder of the statute in place." The
court stated that "the test for severability is whether the constitutional
portion of the statute remains 'complete in itself, [sic] wholly independ-
ent of that which is rejected, and is of such a character as that it may
fairly be presumed that the Legislature would have passed it independent
of that which is in conflict with the Constitution.'"'" Although the court
severed the invalid religious publications exemption, the court disagreed
with Thayer's requested remedy.'
Thayer argued that, under McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco,' her $39,000 tax assessment should be forgiven
16. Id. (quoting Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 n.5).
17. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-35-550(7) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (current version
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
18. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added).
19. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 814.
20. Id. at 815. The court noted that a statute may be partially constitutional and
partially unconstitutional. Id. at 814 (citing Strom v. Amvets, 280 S.C. 146, 311
S.E.2d 721 (1984)).
21. Id. at 815 (quoting Shumpert v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 306 S.C. 64, 69, 409 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1991)).
22. Id.
23. 496 U.S. 18 (1990). For analyses of McKesson, see Russell A. Hollrah,
Refund of Unconstitutional State Taxes: Taxpayer's Right or State's Prerogative, 42
TAX ExEcuTIVE 215 (1990), and James M. Ervin, Jr. & Katherine E. Giddings,
Supreme Court Distinguishes Remedy and Retroactivity Issues Affecting State Taxes,
73 1. TAx'N 296 (1990).
1992]
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because the tax was authorized by an unconstitutional tax scheme.24
McKesson involved Florida's tax scheme that provided a lower excise tax
rate on distributors of liquor manufactured from Florida agricultural
products. Although the Supreme Court of Florida held the Florida tax
unconstitutional, the court did not allow retrospective relief for McKes-
son, a wholesale liquor distributor.' On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held:
[I]f a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax
when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which
he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful
backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional depriva-
tion.26
The Court stated that Florida could revise and apply the liquor tax for
the challenged tax period, provided the reformulated tax treats the
petitioner and competing distributors "in a manner consistent with the
dictates of the Commerce Clause.'27
The Thayer court viewed McKesson as inapposite, stating that
"McKesson requires relief.., only when taxpayers involuntarily pay a
tax that is unconstitutional under existing precedents." 2 The court
concluded that Thayer's tax burden was constitutional despite the
unconstitutional religious publication exemption.29
The Thayer decision is a correct analysis of the requirements of
Texas Monthly. An exemption statute cannot primarily target religion as
the beneficiary. Nevertheless, neither Texas Monthly nor Thayer poses
a significant barrier to a state that wishes to grant a tax exemption for
religious publications; state legislatures can simply draft around the
problem by including in the exemption a broad class of nonreligious
organizations. In fact, within six months of the Texas Monthly decision,
the Texas legislature. redrafted the Texas statute to include an exemption
for not only religious publications, but also "philanthropic, charitable,
historical, scientific, or other similar organization that is not operated for
24. Thayer, 413 S.E.2d at 815.
25. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 25. The Florida court relied on Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a similar tax scheme used by Hawaii
because the tax violated the Commerce Clause). McKesson, 496 U.S. at 23.
26. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.
27. Id. at 40.
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profit."3" Assuming this approach rectifies the Establishment Clause




II. CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT ACTUAL
SCOPE UNDEFINED
In Myers v. 1518 Holmes StreeP2 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a seizure of real property pursuant to the civil forfeiture
statute33 does not violate the takings clause of the South Carolina
Constitution34 because the seizure represents a valid exercise of police
power. 35 Although the court upheld the civil forfeiture statute, the court
failed to define the proper scope of the statute's application.
In late 1989 the Lexington County Sheriffs Department began an
undercover narcotics investigation in the West Columbia area known as
"Happy Town." Narcotics investigators subsequently filed affidavits for
seizure alleging drug trafficking on the property and in the residences
around 1518 Holmes Street. Thereafter, the circuit court issued ex parte
notices and seizure warrants, and the sheriff confiscated the Holmes
Street property pursuant to the civil forfeiture statute. The owners of the
property moved to quash the seizures, claiming that the civil forfeiture
statute violates both the due process and takings clauses of the South
Carolina Constitution.36
30. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (West Supp. 1990).
31. Notably, the South Carolina General Assembly recently passed a joint
resolution to stop the South Carolina Tax Commission from retroactively collecting
taxes not paid by religious retailers because of the unconstitutional exemption. H.R.J.
Res. 4463; 109th Leg., 2d Sess., 1992 S.C. Acts _. The action was probably
motivated by the Tax Commission's intention to tax retroactively religious retailers
as of the date of the Texas Monthly decision. S.C. Tax Comm'n Information Letter
#92-8 (ordered February 19, 1992).
32. 411 S.E.2d 209 (S.C. 1991).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-520 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
34. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("[P]rivate property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation
being first made therefor.").
35. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 211. The court also held that the civil
forfeiture statute does not violate the due process clause of the state constitution, S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 3, even though the statute affords neither preseizure notice nor an
opportunity to be heard. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 212.
36. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 211.
1992]
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The circuit court held that the forfeiture statute does not violate the
due process clause, but that the seizure constituted a taking without just
compensation.37 On appeal, the supreme court agreed that the forfeiture
provisions do not offend due process.3" However, the supreme court
held that the seizure of property was not a taking that would require just
compensation.39
In 1518 Holmes Street the court reiterated the settled principle that
the exercise of eminent domain requires just compensation, whereas the
constitutional exercise of the state's police power does not.40 The
supreme court specifically held that, because civil forfeitures are directed
toward the prevention of serious public harm and are within the
legitimate exercise of the police power, no taking occurs when the State
enforces a civil forfeiture statute.4' However, the court did not examine
the application of the statute to the facts of the case; rather, the court
simply upheld the statute as constitutional.42
Justice Finney dissented, taking issue with the majority's overly
generalized reasoning.43 Justice Finney reviewed the record and
determined that the seizure in this case was an unconstitutional taking
because the State exercised its police power in an impermissibly arbitrary
37. Id.
38. Id. at 212.
39. Id. at211-12.
40. Id. at 211 (citing South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360,
175 S.E.2d 391 (1970)); see also Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91
S.E.2d 280 (1956) (generally discussing difference between eminent domain and
police power); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955)
(holding that order to destroy uninhabitable houses was legitimate exercise of police
power).
41. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 211. The court also noted that the United
States Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between exercises of eminent
domain power and police power. Id. (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926) (upholding use of state police power to seize a car that had been used to
transport illegal liquor); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (upholding Puerto Rican forfeiture statute despite fact that seized property had
been rented from an innocent owner)).
The court's reliance on federal precedent is not surprising because the South
Carolina statute is modeled after the federal civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7) (1988), which has been upheld repeatedly. See, e.g., United States v. 916
Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying § 881(a)(7) without
questioning its constitutionality), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1090 (1991); United States
v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. 3639 2nd St.,
N.E., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).
42. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 211.
43. Id. at 212-14 (Finney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 44
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manner." Notably, however, Justice Finney did not comment on the
constitutionality of the statute itself.
Justice Finney's opinion apparently advocates the "substantial
connection" test adopted by the Fourth Circuit to determine whether the
illegal activities have a sufficient nexus to the property to justify a
seizure.45 Justice Finney noted that the only connection between the
property and the criminal activity was the proximity of the activity to the
property and the fact that in one instance a suspect gave 1518 Holmes
Street as his address.46 Justice Finney obviously believes that the mere
proximity of property to an illegal activity is insufficient to subject the
property to forfeiture.
It is unclear whether the South Carolina Supreme Court would adopt
the substantial connection test because the majority of the court did not
review the facts of this case. However, most people probably would
agree with Justice Finney that it is disturbing that the State can effect a
forfeiture of property based solely on the property's close proximity to
an illegal activity.
Cynthia Buck Brown
III. PROSECUTOR MUST MEET HEIGHTENED BURDEN IN
DEMONSTRATING RACIALLY NEUTRAL EXPLANATION FOR USE OF
PEREMPTORY STRIKES
In State v. Grandy47 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
under Batson v. Kentucky,48 a prosecutor's unexplained desire to seat a
different venireperson on a petit jury does not justify exercising a
peremptory strike upon a black venireperson.49 Although the court's
44. Id. at 214.
45. See Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990 ("Tjhe property must have more than an
incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity."); see also 3639 2nd St.,
N.E., 869 F.2d at 1097 (applying "substantial connection" test). But see 916Douglas
Ave., 903 F.2d at 494 ("A 'substantial connection' is not required between the
property and the related drug offense for forfeiture of real estate under 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7).").
46. 1518 Holmes St., 411 S.E.2d at 214 (Finney, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
47. 411 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 1991).
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race).
49. Grandy, 411 S.E.2d at 208-09.
1992]
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analysis was minimal, ,the Grandy opinion further defines the current
contours of the application of Batson in South Carolina.
Harvey Lee Grandy, a black man, was convicted of trafficking in
cocaine. The court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment and
fined him $200,000. Before trial, the prosecutor struck the only black
member of the venire who was presented, resulting in an all-white
jury." The defendant's counsel challenged this peremptory strike under
Batson,5 but the trial judge found that the prosecutor's reason for the
strike was racially neutral. 2 Although Grandy raised two other issues
50. Id. at 208. However, a black man was seated as an alternate. Record at 8.
51. Counsel for defendant alleged that the all-white jury formed the basis for a
prima facie case. Grandy, 411 S.E.2d at 208. To establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury, the defendant must show:
(1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's racial group; and (3) that the facts and relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecutor used the challenge to exclude potential jurors on the
basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
52. Record at 8-10. Although not quoted in the court's opinion, the prosecutor's
explanation for striking Blake, the black venireperson, from the jury is critical to an
analysis of the scope of the Grandy holding. The prosecutor explained:
Your Honor, at that time I had two strikes, I had three left. Mr.
Blake, I just had a gut feeling on him and I didn't think that he would
make a good juror, but mainly I struck him - I had about four or five
jurors - if I'm not mistaken there were only two seats vacant at the time,
two or three, but I think two. I had two strikes. As I recall it [defense
attorney] had four. What I was trying to do Was to get Mr. James Maye,
Mrs. Elmira Coleman, Mr. Robert or Bo Youngblood and James Beatty;
there was a Van Pressley who I wanted on the jury, even though I found
out after the selection that it wasn't the same Van Pressley that I thought
it was. I made my third strike hoping to get one of those knowing that she
was out or would be out and in fact Mr. James Beaty [sic] was called
which worked for me and she took her fifth strike on him. After that I
was left with only two strikes, I had two people on the jury who I could
not take and I was not about to take a chance on that. I took my chance
early and after that, I could not take a fourth strike because there were
two jurors that I could not take. It was certainly not done by race, it was
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on appeal, 3 the supreme court reversed solely on the Batson chal-
lenge.54
The supreme court found that the solicitor's explanation for the
peremptory strike was entirely deficient.5 In order to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny, the explanation must be "neutral, related to the case to
be tried, clear, reasonably specific and legitimate."56 The Grandy court
concluded that "the solicitor failed to articulate a racially neutral
explanation in his assertion that he excluded the prospective black juror
because he wanted to seat other venirepersons. The court also noted
that the effect of this insufficient explanation was the same as giving no
explanation at all.s
The court's opinion, although brief, accords with Batson and its
progeny. The Batson Court emphasized "that the prosecutor's explana-
tion need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause";59 however, prosecutors no longer have a true peremptory
challenge.' The Grandy decision reflects the tension between the
53. In addition to the Batson argument, the defendant contended that the trial
court denied him a reasonable amount of time to find a private attorney. Grandy, 411
S.E.2d at 207-08. The supreme court rejected this argument, noting that the
defendant had five months to obtain a private attorney and that the defendant was not
denied the assistance of counsel. Id. at 208. Grandy also argued on appeal that the
trial court erred in refusing to charge the lesser included offense of possession with
intent to distribute. Id. The supreme court held that, because there was no dispute in
the evidence that the amount of cocaine in question exceeded the amount required for
trafficking, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the lesser included
offense. Id. (citing Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258 (1990)).
54. Id. at 208-09.
55. Id. The court reasoned that the defendant had established "a prima facie case
[of racial discrimination] by showing that he was [sic] black and that the solicitor
used a peremptory challenge to obtain an all-white jury." Id. at 208. Once the
defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecutor,
who must rebut the presumption of discrimination by providing a racially neutral
explanation for the strike. Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
56. Id. (citing State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 384 S.E.2d 707 (1989)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 209.
59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
60. The extent to which prosecutors continue to have a peremptory challenge
varies from state to state because the Batson Court declined "to formulate particular
procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's
challenges." Id. at 99. The South Carolina Supreme Court has recommended a
bright-line test that directs a Batson hearing on the defendant's request "whenever the
defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exercises
peremptory challenges to remove members of defendant's race from the venire."
State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987).
19921
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prosecution's right to peremptory strikes and a defendant's right to equal
protection.
Although "[t]he peremptory challenge has very old credentials," 6'
it is not mandated by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial
jury. The source of the protection provided by Batson is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 A "defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. '"63 The
protection afforded a defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment must
prevail over a prosecutor's interest in a peremptory challenge.
Grandy, while attempting to delineate the limits of the Supreme
Court's holding in Batson, seriously undermines the existence of the
prosecutor's peremptory challenge without expressly eliminating it. 
6
Recognizing the uncertainties of this kind of approach, Justice Marshall
in Batson advocated the abolition of peremptory challenges in criminal
trials.65 Although the current Supreme Court is unlikely to consider
explicitly abolishing peremptory challenges, states may implicitly abolish
61. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1964), overruled by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Although the Swain Court acknowledged that
"purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race.., violates the Equal
Protection Clause," id. at 203-04, the Court found neither purposeful discrimination,
nor even a prima facie case of discrimination, despite a history of total exclusion of
black veniremen from petit juries since about 1950. Id. at 226-27. Of course, Batson
overruled Swain as to the burden of proof required. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
62. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
63. Jones, 293 S.C. at 56, 358 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96).
In State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 299, 384 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1989), the supreme
court found that "the prosecutor's explanation that the juror was struck because he
'shucked and jived'" constituted the use of a racial stereotype that clearly violated
Batson. Tomlin, which the supreme court referred to in Grandy, illustrates the
persistence of racial discrimination, whether purposeful or otherwise.
64. The Grandy court makes clear that a prosecutor's peremptory strike of a
member of a cognizable racial group must have an actual basis that is specific as to
the venireperson struck and must be able to survive statistical comparison with other
venirepersons who were seated. See Grandy, 411 S.E.2d at 208-09.
65. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-07 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
noted:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily
to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant,"
a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror
had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may
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the prosecutor's peremptory challenge as they continue to refine the
contours of Batson.
After Grandy, prosecutors can no longer arbitrarily use peremptory
strikes to exclude venirepersons of cognizable racial groups, and trial
judges must look at the factors listed in Tomlin when hearing a Batson
motion.'5 Because the threshold defined in State v. Jones67 is easily
met, and because the burden immediately shifts to the prosecution to
come forward with a racially neutral explanation, defense counsel should
make a Batson motion whenever the prosecution exercises a peremptory
strike upon a member of a cognizable racial group.
Tara S. Taggart
66. See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing the test of Tomlin).
67. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
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